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Abstract
Background: The swine influenza H1N1 first identified in Mexico, spread rapidly across the globe and is
considered the fastest moving pandemic in history. The early phase of an outbreak, in which data is relatively
scarce, presents scientific challenges on key issues such as: scale, severity and immunity which are fundamental for
establishing sound and rapid policy schemes. Our analysis of an Israeli dataset aims at understanding the spatio-
temporal dynamics of H1N1 in its initial phase.
Methods: We constructed and analyzed a unique dataset from Israel on all confirmed cases (between April 26 to
July 7, 2009), representing most swine flu cases in this period. We estimated and characterized fundamental
epidemiological features of the pandemic in Israel (e.g. effective reproductive number, age-class distribution, at-risk
social groups, infections between sexes, and spatial dynamics). Contact data collected during this stage was used
to estimate the generation time distribution of the pandemic.
Results: We found a low effective reproductive number (Re = 1.06), an age-class distribution of infected individuals
(skewed towards ages 18-25), at-risk social groups (soldiers and ultra Orthodox Jews), and significant differences in
infections between sexes (skewed towards males). In terms of spatial dynamics, the pandemic spread from the
central coastal plain of Israel to other regions, with higher infection rates in more densely populated sub-districts
with higher income households.
Conclusions: Analysis of high quality data holds much promise in reducing uncertainty regarding fundamental
aspects of the initial phase of an outbreak (e.g. the effective reproductive number Re, age-class distribution, at-
risk social groups). The formulation for determining the effective reproductive number Re used here has many
advantages for studying the initial phase of the outbreak since it neither assumes exponential growth of
infectives and is independent of the reporting rate. The finding of a low Re (close to unity threshold), combined
with identification of social groups with high transmission rates would have enabled the containment of swine
flu during the summer in Israel. Our unique use of contact data provided new insights into the differential
dynamics of influenza in different ages and sexes, and should be promoted in future epidemiological studies.
Thus our work highlights the importance of conducting a comprehensive study of the initial stage of a
pandemic in real time.
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I n f l u e n z aAo ft h eH 1 N 1s u b t y p e ,k n o w na ss w i n ef l u ,
was identified as a new strain in Mexico and is now
considered the fastest moving pandemic in the history
of the world. As it circled the globe it received much
attention by the scientific community and policy makers
[1]. The early phase of an outbreak presents scientists
with challenges on key issues such as: the magnitude of
the problem at hand when a disease first appears, popu-
lation susceptibility, attack rates, and severity of the ill-
ness and its symptoms, all of which are uncertain when
a new disease first appears. Acting early and establishing
rapid policy schemes is crucial. However such urgent
decisions have to be made under great uncertainty due
to the lack, or poor quality, of data [2].
Several basic characteristics of the swine flu epidemic
differentiate it from seasonal influenza. The disease
spread during late spring and summer in Northern
Hemisphere [3] - a phenomenon that has also been
observed in previous pandemics [4]. Also, the age distri-
bution of individuals infected with swine flu deviates
from that of seasonal influenza - with more morbidity
and mortality amongst young adults [5], again a charac-
teristic noted in previous pandemics [6,7].
This work makes use of the fact that the data gathered
in Israel from April 26, 2009 (the first confirmed case)
until July 7, 2009, is of great detail. During the first two
months of the outbreak the Israeli health authorities
attempted to identify and test all cases of people suspected
with symptomatic swine flu. Their efforts were aided by
the high media impact of the disease and the attentiveness
of the general public. There is reason to believe that most
symptomatic swine flu cases in Israel over this period were
diagnosed by the national surveillance campaign, making
the dataset unique in its detail and scope.
The national surveillance also provided contact data
that presented a snapshot of the population’s infection
network. During the time span of this study the number
of laboratory confirmed cases in Israel (713) was the
third highest in Europe exceeded only by the UK and
Spain, which have much larger populations [8]. The pre-
valence and fatality rate of swine flu in Israel remained
high compared to other Mediterranean and European
countries.
We examined the spatio-temporal distribution of all
cases and sub-groups and various characteristics of the
disease. This analysis of the unique Israeli dataset made
it possible to elucidate numerous interesting aspects of
the initial phase of a pandemic.
Methods
Our analysis is based only on cases that are laboratory
confirmed with swine flu. The first person to be diag-
nosed in Israel as suffering from swine influenza
infection arrived to Israel from Mexico and was hospita-
lized in the Laniado hospital on April 26, 2009. For the
first cases the laboratory tests were PCR amplification of
the matrix (M) gene followed by sequence analysis
which demonstrated a perfect match to the A/Califor-
nia/7/2009 strain [9]. Later cases were identified using
the WHO/CDC protocol (http://www.who.int/csr/
resources/publications/swineflu/CDCRealtimeRTPCR_S-
wineH1Assay-2009_20090430.pdf). The clinical samples
collected were throat swab specimen and two nasal
swab specimens, one from each nostril collected into
viral transport medium.
A database of all cases confirmed to have swine flu
w a sa s s e m b l e da tt h eN a t i o n al Influenza Center in the
Central Virology Laboratory, Tel Hashomer, Israel, from
the 26
th of April until July 7, 2009. All patients tested
were requested to provide the following personal details:
n a m e ,a g e ,s e x ,d i s e a s ei n i t iation (as reported by the
patient), date of arrival to the clinic, return from a for-
eign country in the previous week, contact with other
infected patients, visits to educational institutions, and
symptoms. Patients were also classified according to the
respective social groups to which they belong to such as
soldiers, ultra-orthodox Jews, or Arabs. Altogether circa
2,400 samples of patients with symptoms of influenza
like illness (ILI) were taken, of which 713 (30%) were
found positive. This number should closely match most
Israelis with symptomatic swine flu in this time period
(see below for more details). As a result of the WHO
guidelines, the systematic collection of samples from all
suspected patients ended after July 2 2009, and the ana-
lyses reported here are based on data collected up to
July 7.
Obtaining a comprehensive database that includes
most symptomatic cases was possible due to both exten-
sive efforts made by the Israeli health authorities and
particular attributes of the country of Israel. During the
initial phase of the outbreak, the Deputy Director Gen-
eral of the Ministry of Health (MoH) conducted meet-
ings or teleconferences with representatives of all
medical institutions, government agencies responsible
for disease control and professional consultants regard-
ing the pandemic situation almost daily. The goal of the
MoH during this period was to mitigate the epidemic as
much as possible. An important part of the MoH strat-
egy was based on having the best possible surveillance
of infected cases. To achieve this, the General Director
of the MoH published between the 5
th of April and the
17
th of August 7 MoH guidelines and binding regula-
tions for the H1N1 pandemic. The documents have a
legal status and the entire Israeli medical establishment
(doctors, Health Maintenance Organizations - HMOs,
hospitals) is required to follow these guidelines. In addi-
tion the Israeli authorities launched a media campaign
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symptoms, or anyone in contact with people having ILI
symptoms, to be tested for the H1N1 virus. Below we
summarize their main policy guidelines.
On the 5
th of April 2009, the Ministry added H1N1 to
the list of mandatory reportable diseases. Anyone sus-
pected of having a respiratory illness, was tested using
swabs which were sent to the Ministry’s Central Virol-
ogy Laboratory. In the first stages of the outbreak (until
17.6.2009) all laboratory diagnosed cases were hospita-
lized. Official epidemiological forms were provided to
the medical staff at hospitals and in community clinics.
In cases of a cluster of three or more confirmed cases
the guidelines required the Health District Physician to
conduct a full epidemiological investigation and to
report the results to the MoH headquarters. At the Ben-
Gurion international airport (the main international air-
port in the country) a special medical clinic was opened
for examining every passenger who arrived to Israel
from Mexico within 7 days of departure from Mexico.
At a later stage every passenger arriving from Mexico,
the US or Canada with fever within the previous 24
hours was tested and sent to a hospital directly from the
airport. All patients were hospitalized in isolation condi-
tions to prevent further spread of the disease.
In addition to the above, Israel has several unique
characteristics which made a major contribution to the
success of MoH’s surveillance during the initial stage of
the pandemic. Israel is a small country in size (21,000
km
2). There is hardly any human movement across the
land borders and most people entering the country are
passengers entering the Ben-Gurion International air-
port. Also, during the initial phase, the pandemic
received a great deal of attention from all branches of
the media. The Israeli public health system is composed
of four HMOs which work in tight connection with the
MoH and there was excellent collaboration during the
outbreak between the different organizations. Israel also
has wide experience in preparing for catastrophic events
as evidenced by the detailed Israeli pandemic prepared-
ness program from 2007 (http://www.health.gov.il/
Download/pages/tol_pand07.doc) which had planned the
surveillance program in great detail ahead of time. Tak-
ing into account all of these attributes, the Israeli MoH
argued that during the initial phase of the epidemic, it
was possible to pinpoint most symptomatic case of
swine flu is Israel - making this dataset very promising
for epidemiological analysis.
Estimating the reproductive number R0 is of great
importance when studying epidemics, When, as in
many situations, the population is not fully suscepti-
ble (S0 < N) the effective reproduction number - Re
which is defined as: Re =R 0·S0/N [10], is used. Our
estimates of Re are based on the formulation of a
discrete-time stochastice p i d e m i cm o d e lc l o s e l y
related to the well known SIR model [11]. The model
allows for intrinsic demographic stochasticity and
makes a clear distinction between primary and sec-
ondary infectors (see also [12]). Full details describing
the derivation of the estimate for Re can be found in
[13]. For the purposes of this paper we need only
state our formula, namely:
ˆ Re =
T 
t=d+1
i(t)
T 
τ=d+1
d 
τ=1
Pτ[i(t − τ)+i0(t − τ)]
(1)
Here i(t) represents the number of newly infected
individuals on day t as observed in the surveillance
time-series which are to be differentiated from primary
or imported infectors arriving from abroad on day t as
denoted by i
0(t).T h en u m b e r sPτ (1≤=τ≤=d) represent
the generation time distribution or infectivity profile. In
a totally susceptible population, Pτ is the fraction of
infections generated by an infective person which occur
on day τ of infection (thus
d
τ=1 Pτ = 1). The generation
time distribution is estimated from the infection net-
works data as described below.
T h ed a t ap r o v i d e st h en u m b e ri(t)of confirmed cases
on each day t of the study period. Since the cases are all
laboratory-confirmed, there is little danger of false-posi-
tives. However, the number i(t) may under-estimate the
true incidence, for two reasons: some of the infections
may be non-symptomatic, and some of the symptomatic
infections may not seek medical care. However, under
the assumption that the probabilities of non-sympto-
matic infection and of seeking medical care are constant
during the period in question, if there is an under-esti-
mation of the true number of cases, it will not affect the
estimate of the effective reproductive number. Indeed,
denoting the probability that an influenza case will be
symptomatic by s and the probability that a sympto-
matic case will be reported by r, then the true number
of cases
 
i(t) i sg i v e ni nt e r m so ft h ec o n f i r m e dn u m b e r
of cases by
 
i(t)=
i(t)
r · s
. Since the estimator of Re does
not change when the time series i(t) is multiplied by a
constant, the estimate is unchanged.
A major advantage of estimating Re by fitting a sto-
chastic model to the data is the fact that we do not
make any a-priori assumption of exponential growth.
Although the stochastic model indeed leads to exponen-
tial growth when the number of cases is large, the
model also generates an initial “stochastic” phase, and is
thus suitable for modeling the initial phase of an
epidemic.
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Page 3 of 13There were 451 patients who reported the date at
which they perceived their illness began. We calculated
the difference between this onset date and the date in
which they arrived at the health clinic or hospital for
treatment. Also, most individuals tested for swine flu
were asked by their doctor to identify who they believed
they were infected from. Of the 713 cases, 183 (25.6%)
were able to provide information establishing contact
links. This data was used to assemble contact networks
which map the connections between an infected person
(infector) and the different individuals he/she infected
(infectees). Based on the contact networks, it was possi-
ble to determine the generation-time interval distribu-
tion for swine flu - the distribution of durations
between the time an individual becomes infected and
the times of infection of the people he or she infects.
We used the reported dates of disease initiation at both
ends of a link as the samples of the generation-time
intervals. We counted all infector ® infectee relations
between males (M) and females (F), and also between
age classes. The expected numbers of these interactions
were then calculated assuming random mixing between
groups of infectors and infectees via standard contin-
gency table analysis [14].
We used the geographic locality information to plot
the spatial dynamics of the epidemic. Each case was
assigned to one of fifteen sub-districts in Israel. As the
correlation between the population size and the number
of cases in each sub-district proved highly significant (P-
value <0.0001, R
2 = 0.833), for all further analyses we
used the rates of swine flu per 100,000 people. These
rates were plotted for each week of the epidemic in the
different sub-districts. We conducted a spatial autocor-
relation analysis by calculating the global Moran’sI
i n d e x[ 1 5 ]f o rt h ea b o v er a t e si nt h ef i r s t1 1w e e k so f
the epidemic. The index was also calculated for the
cumulative rate over the entire time frame.
We conducted a forward stepwise multiple regression of
the influenza rates (in the different sub-regions), against
several explanatory variables: sub-district area, percentage
of built area, average gross household income, average
number of inhabitants per household, percentage of work-
force arriving from other sub-districts, and mean maxi-
mum and minimum temperatures over the duration of the
epidemic. Furthermore, we applied the Akaike information
criterion (AIC) in order to choose the best fitting model
among several possible models (see below) [16].
Results
The time series of swine flu cases in Israel during the
initial phase of the outbreak is displayed in Figure 1a. In
the first weeks of the epidemic, nearly all new cases
arrived sporadically from abroad, infecting some indivi-
duals but eventually becoming locally extinct, as seen in
the period April 26 to June 6, 2009 (Figure 1a). In the
month of June the percentage of primary cases (arriving
from abroad) vs. secondary cases (infected locally) drops,
but still remains relatively high (Figure 1b). In the second
week of June, some nineteen members of a group of visit-
ing young American students (from the “birthright” pro-
gram) traveling the country were confirmed to have
swine flu. The records show that at least twelve other
patients came into contact with this group, most of them
soldiers (see below). Since the arrival of these young tra-
velers, there was a clear jump in the number of cases and
in the spatial spread of the disease (Figures 1a, 2).
Although the pandemic was inevitable in Israel, with or
without this specific group, the surveillance procedures
were refined to a degree that enabled identification of the
key triggering factors.
Basic reproductive number
For the Israeli swine flu time series (Figure 1), our mod-
eling approach produced estimates for Re =1 . 0 6w i t ha
95% confidence interval 0.963-1.134. Our results high-
light the importance of separately modeling imported
infected persons migrating into a region or country,
rather than considering them as just a particular subset
of the local infected population. The latter is an incor-
rect approach and will result in an over-estimate of Re.
For example, had all infections been regarded as local,
the estimate for Re via Equation (1) (taking i
0(t) =0 ) ,
would have resulted in Re = 1.27 (95% C.I. 1.17,1.37).
Alternatively, if the imported infectives had been
removed from the data, this would have resulted in Re =
1.26 (95% C.I. 1.16, 1.37). Although as the epidemic
spreads the number of immigrant cases becomes negligi-
ble in comparison to the locally infected cases, in the
timeframe covered by this study this stage is not yet
reached (see figure 1b). As the example here shows, at
the initiation of the epidemic, the imported infectives
have a significant effect on the estimate of Re.
The mean time of delay between arrival at the hospital
or health clinic and the reported date at which patients
perceived their illness began is 1.93 days with a mode of
one day and median of two days (see Figure 3). Hence,
a large portion of the patient’s infectivity period was in
fact prior to their diagnosis. The significance of this
finding is discussed below.
Age distribution
The mean age of the confirmed cases was 22.1 years
w i t ham e d i a no f2 1a n dam o d eo f2 0 .T h ea g ed i s t r i -
bution of cases in many other countries in the same
period gave a median age lower than 20 [17] (Figure 4
shows the age distribution of cases in Israel). Cases were
divided into three different age classes 0-18, 19-30 and
a b o v e3 0 .C a l c u l a t i n gt h ei n c i d e n c er a t ef o rt h e
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Page 4 of 13secondary cases (i.e. those infected within Israel) over
the entire period of data collection for each of the age
groups, we obtained the following rates per 100,000: 7.5
(0-18), 17.3 (19-30), 2.9 (31+). Two features of this age
distribution seem striking: 1) The very low rates in
adults over 30 compared to the other groups. 2) The
high rates among young adults (19-30) compared to
children (more than twice). Compared to data from
other countries (see Figure 5) it appears that the first
feature is common to many countries, while the second
feature is not typical. The 19-30 age group rapidly
increased from early June and remained high, but the 0-
18 age group became significant only later (Figure 6).
Contact Structure and Infection Networks
Altogether there were 66 separate infection networks
totaling 183 nodes, with 123 links between them, many
networks were disconnected with many isolated links.
55.2% of the nodes had no outgoing links, 33.3% had
one outgoing link, 7.1% had two outgoing links and
2.7% had three outgoing links. In addition there were
three patients who might be considered “superinfectors”
with four, seven and ten outgoing links. The mean num-
ber of outgoing links per node was 0.67. Note that this
number is much lower than the value of Re =1 . 0 6w e
calculated for this timeframe, which is unsurprising in
view of the fact that many of our networks only provide
a sample of all infections. Despite the fact that our net-
works only represent a sample of actual infections we
can, under the assumption ofr a n d o ms a m p l i n g ,u s e
them to estimate statistical characteristics of infection
times and relative rates of infection among various
groups.
Generation-time distribution
The mean generation-time was found to be μ =2 . 9 2
and its standard deviation s = 1.79 based on a genera-
tion time distribution of up to seven days. Figure 7
Figure 1 Time series of swine flu in Israel. a- time series of swine flu cases in Israel between the 26/4/2009 and the 7/7/2009, altogether 713
cases. Bars represent the incidences per day (left Y-bar scale) and line the cumulative number (right Y-bar scale). Also marked is the date when the
systematic data collection ended (dashed line). b- Percentage of primary versus secondary cases over the epidemic from the 20
th of May onwards.
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time. Superimposed on the histogram is the best fitting
gamma distribution which was found to have μ =2 . 9 5
and s = 1.43 (with the parameters a = 4.25, b = 1.44).
The contact networks include reports of infection for
periods longer than seven days. However, data about
infections beyond seven days is controversial [18], and
were not included when fitting the gamma distribution.
Male and Female Contact rates
The networks were composed of 123 different links
defining infector ® infectee relations between males
(M) and females (F) (Table 1). Our analysis shows that
the observed numbers are not significantly different
than expected by random mixing (p = 0.942, c
2 =
0.0052, Yates corrected chi-square test).
Age-class contact structure
The contact networks analysis of the age-class structure
is shown in Table 2. The observed data is significantly
different from expected (p = 6.8E-6, c
2 = 29.3, chi-
square test) and individuals in different age classes are
not mixing randomly. The most significant differences
are found within age-classes (i.e., along the matrix’s
diagonal) which show large deviations from random
mixing. Individuals within the 19-30 age class infect one
another three times more than expected via random
mixing. The two age-groups 0-18 and 19-30 appear to
infect one another less than expected (see Table 2).
Sex ratio
The male to female sex ratio of swine flu cases was
skewed, with 59.6% males and 40.4% females (n = 713).
Figure 3 Delay between disease initiation and doctor visit. Frequency distribution of the number of days of delay between the reported
initiation of the disease and the visit to the health clinic or hospital (N = 451).
Figure 2 “Birthright” influence on spread. Influence of the group of young American students (from the “Birthright” project) on time series of
swine flu cases in Israel. The dashed line shows all the cases that were either group members or identified themselves as being in contact with
the “Birthright” group. The solid line displays the rest of the cases.
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entire Israeli population which stands at 50.4% males to
49.6% females (P < 0.0001, c
2 = 24.1, Yates corrected
chi-square test after appropriately normalizing the gen-
eral population by the age structure distribution of
swine flu cases). The high male sex ratio was compared
to that observed in seasonal flu records collected over a
ten year period from one of Israel’s health maintenance
organizations (n = 286,310). The seasonal flu data has
more females (46.1% males, 53.9% females), and these
proportions are significantly different from those of
swine flu (P < 0.0001, c
2 = 52.18, Yates corrected chi-
square test). The Israeli male to female sex ratio for
swine flu cases is also higher than that reported in Eur-
ope (male 52.4%, female 47.6% - [19]) and several other
countries with available data (Belgium -[20], Chile -[21],
France - [22], Italy -[23], Greece -[24]). The analysis of
a more updated swine flu data-set which includes an
additional 3,340 confirmed cases further supported this
deviation with a male percentage of 54.5%.
Social groups
We examined the epidemic dynamics of several distin-
guishable social groups. Soldiers, for example, who com-
p r i s es o m e2 . 4 %o ft h eI s r a e l ip o p u l a t i o n[ 2 5 ] ,a r e
relatively connected within themselves and isolated from
the rest of the population in terms of daily activities.
Soldiers were highly represented among swine flu cases
with 107 confirmed cases, which is an incidence of 60.6
cases per 100,000 people in this group; seven times
higher than the non-soldier public (8.5 cases per
100,000 people). Ultra-orthodox Jews were found to
have roughly the same incidence as the rest of the
Israeli population (10.4 versus 9.8 cases per 100,000
respectively). Nevertheless, the first ultra-orthodox
swine flu case was reported on June 22, 2009, and since
this date ultra-orthodox Jewish cases represent 17.8% of
all cases (in this, more limited time frame), whereas they
represent only about 10% of the Israeli population [26].
In our database there were only 3 cases of Arabs with
swine flu. This value corresponds to an incidence of 0.2
Figure 4 The number of swine flu cases at each age.
Figure 5 Age distribution of cases in different countries. Standardized rates of swine flu in different age classes and different countries. The
number of cases in each age class is divided by total population in these ages, and these rates are later divided by the sum of all of the rates
in all age classes. These rates were calculated for the USA - A (confirmed cases from the 15/4-24/7/2009 Based on [55]), Europe - B (confirmed
cases up to the 20/7/2009 based on [17]) and Chile - C (all confirmed cases up to the 2/7/2009 based on [7]) and compared to their parallel
rates in Israel.
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100,000 people in the non-Arab population of Israel.
Spatial analysis
The rates for each week of the epidemic in the different
sub-districts are displayed in Figure 8. The epidemic is
more pronounced in the central-western part of Israel,
which generally showed higher rates than other regions
and from there it spread to the north east, and south. In
the first six weeks, swine influenza was unable to persist
in all regions; it went locally extinct in 7 of the 13 sub-
districts up to this point. Additionally the incidence
rates remain below 1 infected person per 100,000 peo-
ple. After this period the epidemic climbs - regions
which had infections remained infected, and the rates
increase.
Table 3 displays the Moran’s I values for the autocor-
relation analysis. In the first six weeks there is a pattern
of spatial non-random dispersion - negative (but non-
significant) I values. From the seventh week onward the
pattern changes, the rates in the different regions show
autocorrelation - positive I values which are significant
for 3 of the 5 weeks (see Table 3). The total Moran’sI
value for all of the weeks combined also showed signifi-
cant spatial autocorrelation (I = 0.194, Z = 4.267, P <
0.0001).
When analyzing the various explanatory factors of the
swine-flurates in different sub-districts, using the
Figure 6 Time series of swine flu cases divided into three different age groups.
Figure 7 Frequency distribution of the swine flu generation time. This is based on differences in reported disease initiation dates that were
calculated from our infection networks. Also displayed is a Gamma distribution curve (dashed line) based on data only up to seven days - dark
bars (see text for details).
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cant - percentage of built area and gross household
income (P-value = 0.0001, R
2 = 0.77). These two spatial
predictors are significantly positively correlated to each
other (P-Value = 0.046, R
2 = 0.273). When looking at
the AICc values of 17 different model combinations, the
model including just these two factors had the lowest
A I C cs c o r ew i t ha nA I C cw e i g h to f5 5 . 3 %( s e eT a b l e4
for a detailed table of AICc and model combinations).
Discussion
Pandemic influenza is considered one of the largest bur-
dens to human health [27]. However, data on the initia-
tion phase of pandemic is scarce. Understanding the
dynamics at this phase is fundamental in determining
the consequent impact of the disease on human popula-
tions. The data gathered in Israel during the initiation of
the current H1N1 influenza pandemic is one of the best
such datasets in the world, creating a rare opportunity
for analysis. Such data and real time analysis can greatly
aid management schemes.
It is now known that both for seasonal influenza [28]
and the swine flu pandemic there was a considerable
proportion of asymptomatic cases [29-31]. However it is
unclear how important, if at all, is the role of these
cases in epidemic dynamics [32,33], The proportion of
asymptomatic cases in the 2009 pandemic is believed to
range from 10% to 90% [29,30]. Unfortunately in the
c u r r e n ts t u d yw ew e r eu n a b l et oa n a l y z et h er o l eo ft h e
asymptomatic cases on the spread of the pandemic.
However, if the proportion of symptomatic to asympto-
matic cases is constant during the period of the study
then our estimates of Re should be valid (see method for
details). Furthermore, our epidemiological analyses of
rates in different social groups, ages, sexes or regions
should also hold providing asymptomatic cases are dis-
tributed in the population in the same manner as symp-
tomatic cases. Therefore this lacuna in our data should
not undermine the conclusions based on it.
Our estimate of the reproductive number Re =1 . 0 6
was only slightly larger than unity. This is relatively low
compared to calculations reported in Mexico, USA,
Canada, Australia, New-Zealand and Japan based on
data from the initiation phase of the current epidemic
which range from 1.31-4.11 [34-40], and also lower than
estimates based on data from previous pandemics [41].
However, low estimates of Re were also reported for
Mexico and the Netherlands [42,43]. This low estimate
could derive from either unfavorable weather condition
upon the late arrival of this strain [44], more immunity
of the Israeli population to this particular strain, relative
to other countries [45,46], or efficient containment mea-
sures by the Israeli health authorities. The fact that Re
was so close to unity raises possibility of containing or
mitigating the spread of the disease [47].
Many studies of the current pandemic emphasize the
lower rates among adults older than 30 years relative to
the younger age groups, and the same was found here.
However, an intriguing feature of the age distribution
derived from the Israeli data is the very high rates
among young adults (19-30) as compared to children.
This characteristic appears to be exclusive for Israel. We
should mention that during the time of the research
there were no prolonged school vacations and the
school year ended either on the 30
th of June for primary
schools or the 20
th of June for high-schools (i.e., at simi-
lar dates to other northern hemisphere countries). With
respect to school closure - only one school in Israel was
closed, for a few days, as a response to a high ratio of
infection in one of its classes and not as a preplanned
preventative measure. We can therefore assume that the
different age morbidity in Israel has no clear relation to
any events that pertain to the Israeli education system.
Ahmed et al. [6] show that during the 1918 pandemic
there were higher infection rates in young adults, which
were explained by more immunological memory for
adults (aged > 30 ) and a “honeymoon period” for chil-
dren having less severe symptoms. It is possible that a
unique memory effect has a role in the current pan-
demic in Israel, shaping its age group distribution.
It is also possible that this effect is due to transient
dynamics at the start of the epidemic related perhaps to
the higher representation of young adults, as compared
to children, among international travelers. Thus the age
Table 1 Characterization of all possible observed male-
female interactions
Infectee
male female Sum.
Infector male 41 (40.32) 46 (46.6) 87
female 16 (16.68) 20 (19.31) 36
Sum. 57 66 122
For example there were 57 infected males, of which 41 contracted influenza
from male infectors, while 16 contracted influenza from female infectors. The
numbers given in brackets are the expected number of interactions
determined from a standard contingency table analysis.
Table 2 Comparison of inter and intra age-group
infections (3 age group classes)
Infectee
0-18 19-30 above 30 Sum.
0-18 46 (36.1) 6 (13.7) 18 (20.1) 70
infector 19-30 6 (14.9) 15 (5.7) 8 (8.3) 29
above 30 11 (11.9) 3 (4.5) 9 (6.6) 23
Sum. 63 24 35 122
We use our infection network to compare observed vs. calculated rate (using
all our data for null probabilities). The matrix displays the number of observed
versus expected (in brackets) values between all combinations of age groups.
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Page 9 of 13distribution at the initial stages of an epidemic can be
quite different from the distribution at later stages due
to the importance of stochastic effects combined with
population heterogeneity. Therefore age-class data from
the initial phase of outbreak should be used with great
caution in making decisions, for example on vaccination
policy.
The contact network data enabled us to estimate the
generation-time interval distribution, as well as the
matrices describing infections among sexes, and age
classes. An analysis of the contact data shows that the
infectivity of most people peaks within two days fol-
lowed by a gradual decline with instances of influenza
transmission even a week after the infector’sd i s e a s e
initiation. This information should be coupled with the
fact that it also takes several days (with a mean of 1.9
days) for infected people to reach a clinic for diagnosis
in the first place (other countries show similar patterns
[22-24]). This fact can make control of the spread of the
epidemic difficult as most of the infection occurs prior
to diagnosis.
High levels of heterogeneity in transmission were
observed when comparing different groups such as
ultra-orthodox Jews, soldiers, Arabs, and by looking at
sexes. For example, after the initial infection of the
ultra-orthodox community (June 22
nd) their infection
rate was higher than the general population. This com-
munity is relatively isolated from the rest of the
Figure 8 Spatial spread of swine flu in sub-districts of Israel. The data are combined for each week up to week ten of the epidemic (week
three had no cases in it and therefore isn’t displayed). The color of the region represents its rate of Influenza, from dark green - low rate (up to
0.5 cases per 100,000 people) to red- high rate (5-6 cases per 100,000 people). The panes represent different weeks (A-first 26/4-2/5/2009, B-
second 3-9/5/2009, C-fourth 17-23/5/2009, D-fifth 24-30/5/2009, E-sixth 31/5-6/6/2009, F-seventh 7-13/6/2009, G-eighth 14-20/6/2009, H-ninth 21-
27/6/2009, I-tenth 28/6-4/7/2009). Also on the map five major cities of Israel are marked as dots; the cities are (from north to south): Haifa, Tel-
Aviv, Jerusalem, Be’er-Sheva, Eilat.
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Page 10 of 13population, which may account for the delay in its infec-
tion. However, ultra-orthodox Jews live in very dense
communities with relatively big households [26] which
would lead to higher rates once infection commenced.
A similar mechanism can also be postulated for the sol-
dier sub-group - which has many internal connections.
A group of soldiers living in close quarters in the USA
have also exhibited increased swine flu illness exposure
and susceptibility [48]. In Israel, soldiers were infected
early on in the epidemic via contacts with a group of
American students and it is understood that this chance
initial event combined with their unique living quarters
and behavior, is likely to be the explanation for their
high infection rates. All of these are possible explana-
tions for the unusual age distribution found among the
infected Israeli population, as the soldiers all belong to
the 19-30 age group.
In contrast, the Arab population - another relatively
isolated social group within Israel - showed significantly
lower rates of infection throughout. It is possible that
during the timeframe of this study the disease had yet
to penetrate this social group. These results can demon-
strate how in the initial phase of an outbreak - within
distinct social groups - different social groups can pre-
sent different behaviors due to chance infection events.
Another puzzling result concerns the male bias in the
sex ratio of infections, a result also noted for other
infectious diseases [49]. It is hypothesized that beha-
vioral and physiological differences could result in this
gender bias [50,51]. Making use of this knowledge of
how heterogeneity affects disease dynamics might be
useful in improving control, mitigation and policy pro-
grams [52].
The spatial analysis reveals that percentage of built
area and gross household income explain differences in
the prevalence of swine flu between regions. The first of
these factors pinpoints the epidemic to those regions
which are more densely populated - an attribute that
can aid the rapid transmission of influenza. Higher
income families are inclined to travel more and come in
contact with more people, both internally and abroad
[50,53]. Thus, it is likely that persons from such families
Table 3 Global spatial autocorrelation computations
using Moran’s I values
Week Moran’s I Z value P value
1 -0.035 0.398 0.690
2 -0.058 0.107 0.915
3-- -
4 -0.023 0.616 0.538
5 -0.143 -1.019 0.308
6 -0.103 -0.563 0.573
7 0.176 2.752 0.006
8 0.141 2.061 0.039
9 0.004 0.675 0.500
10 0.401 4.787 <0.001
11 0.066 1.299 0.194
All weeks 0.194 4.267 <0.001
Displayed are the values of Moran’s I values calculated based on rates and
distances between sub-districts of Israel, for each of the initial 11 weeks of the
epidemic (but the third week that had no cases). Also displayed is this value
for the cumulative rates of all of the weeks. For each value of Moran’sIw e
show the corresponding Z and P values.
Table 4 Values of AICc for models with different variables explaining spatial distribution of influenza in sub-districts
of Israel
Model parameters K AICc Delta AICc AICc weights Cumulative weights P-value Adjusted R
2
Built area + income 4 1.16 0 0.55 0.55 0.000145 0.7327
Built area 3 3.81 2.66 0.15 0.7 0.000299 0.6201
Built area + income + household size 5 5.48 4.32 0.06 0.76 0.000676 0.7151
Built area + income + commuting 5 5.82 4.67 0.05 0.82 0.000766 0.7084
Built area + commuting 4 6.33 5.17 0.04 0.86 0.001147 0.6226
Commuting 3 6.75 5.59 0.03 0.89 0.001123 0.5378
Income + commuting 4 7.19 6.03 0.03 0.92 0.001614 0.6004
Built area + household size 4 7.59 6.43 0.02 0.94 0.001897 0.5895
Household size + commuting 4 8.11 6.95 0.02 0.96 0.002332 0.5752
Income 3 8.48 7.32 0.01 0.97 0.00247 0.4814
Income + household size 4 9.02 7.86 0.01 0.98 0.003359 0.5485
Income + household size + commuting 5 9.98 8.83 0.01 0.99 0.003381 0.6152
Built area + household size + commuting 5 10.97 9.81 0 0.99 0.004787 0.5892
Built area + income + household size + commuting 6 11.25 10.09 0 1 0.002689 0.6879
Household size 3 12.45 11.29 0 1 0.01569 0.3242
Temp 3 15.77 14.61 0 1 0.0798 0.1572
Built area + income + household size + commuting + temp 7 18.24 17.08 0 1 0.007742 0.6648
The analysis was conducted on 15 subdistricts with combinations of five explanatory variables (see text). The table displays the combination of the models
chosen, the number of parameter in each model (K), and their appropriate AICc, Delta AICc, AICc weights, cumulative weights, P-values and adjusted R
2 values.
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Page 11 of 13are more likely to come in contact with an infected indi-
vidual in the initial stages of an international outbreak.
The central coastal plain of Israel, in and around the
city of Tel-Aviv, has consistently higher rates and per-
haps acts as an initiation point for the spread to other
regions. This is also manifested by looking at the values
of the spatial autocorrelation (Table 3). The central
coastal plain of Israel is the cultural and business hub of
the country; it is the most densely populated region,
with more commuting into it from neighboring regions
[54]. This region also houses the major international air-
port of Israel, harbors most of the commerce and trade
of the country, and had milder temperatures during
these eleven weeks. It is therefore unsurprising that
there are higher rates of swine flu in this region as well
as it being an initiation point of the spread of the epi-
demic to other regions in the country.
Conclusions
Our detailed contact networks enabled us to perform
unique analysis on the particular relationships between
different groups of society (categorized by age, sex, eth-
nicity, etc.). The analysis highlighted at-risk groups as
well as paths of spread between them, at this initial
stage. As contact data is generally not available, few
such studies have been conducted. Such detailed infor-
mation, if obtained and analyzed in real time has much
potential in management and mitigation of an epidemic
as it spreads.
Our analysis made it possible to elucidate the spatio-
temporal dynamics of the initiation of this pandemic in
Israel. Examining the rates of influenza in different
regions of Israel as the pandemic developed uncovered
patterns of spatial spread, as well as disease clusters.
Correlating disease rates to various socio-economical
attributes of these regions suggested a potential
mechanism generating these spatial patterns. Such spa-
tial analysis holds much promise for other epidemiologi-
cal studies with available locality information.
Gathering detailed data from different parts of the
world and looking for statistical universalities as well as
crucial differences should be of great value to better
characterize and improve our understanding of the
initial phase of the swine flu pandemic and forthcoming
outbreaks. Further work is also needed to evaluate the
n e x tp h a s eo ft h ep a n d e m i c .W eh o p eo u rc o n t r i b u t i o n
both sheds light on the dynamics of swine flu and pro-
vides methods for analyzing future pandemics.
All authors declare no conflict of interests relating to
this article.
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